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Most theorists today and the speakers at the McGeorge 2002 Annual
International Law Symposium on "Corporate and Securities Law in the TwentyFirst Century" have written and spoken about what is sometimes termed as the
"vertical" aspects of corporate governance. Vertical governance deals with the
election by owners (shareholders), who presumably are numerous, of directors to
a board.' A board of directors
then, in turn, appoints, monitors, and if necessary,
S 2
removes senior executives. Those executives hire employees, again, who are

*

W. Edward Sell Professor of Business Law, University of Pittsburgh, School of Law. Portions of this article

have been previously published within CORNE.L IN'L L. J.
1. The name actually derives from the seating arrangement, in which the overseers of a corporation
would meet around a makeshift table formed by laying a plank or a board across some barrels. The board "came
to be the symbol representing the assembled owners of an enterprise." See, e.g., RALPH D. WARD, 21ST
CENTURY CORPORATE BOARD 30 (1997).
2. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 1.01-1.22 ("Directors' Selection"),
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presumably great in number, to do the corporation's business on many fronts and
in the trenches, if you will. Legal and business educators often depict vertical
corporate governance as a pyramid, with shareholders at the base and the handful
of senior executives at the apex.3
My subject today is "horizontal" corporate governance. This subject deals
with how a corporation's shareholders, directors, executives, and finally, employees
interrelate with each other, spread horizontally, and affect the world around them.
Professor Lawrence Cunningham distinguishes among "vertical" governance
mechanisms of the type previously described and "external" or "external horizontal"
governance mechanisms. 4 If we define corporate governance as the allocation of
power or authority to allocate, and the allocation of, the corporation's resources
among its various constituencies (shareholders, directors, managers, and employees),5
how does that allocation affect non-constituents or less recognized constituents
(communities, host nation-states, clean air and clean water, and the like) of the
large global enterprise?
In the 1970s, legal scholars wrote extensively on the subject, as it was then
known, "corporate social responsibility."' Proposals surfaced for public interest
directors, mandatory social accounting and disclosure, increased use of Security
Exchange Commission (SEC) shareholder proxy proposals, federal minimum
legal standards, and federal chartering of large corporations. However, that
debate was eclipsed completely by the law and economics movement of the
1980s. Now, in the new century, the inquiry into social responsibility of large
corporations has begun anew. This article is an attempt to take that inquiry, or
debate, and place it in the international context.
I have four stories to tell. First is that much of the globalization ballyhooed
by Thomas Friedman7 and other passionate globalization advocates may be
"negative" rather than "beneficial" globalization. Second, I describe another
profound occurrence, that is, the growth in number and size of gargantuan
multinational corporations. Third, I describe some of the problems perceived to
be created by the growth of large multinationals, such as regulatory arbitrage,

§§ 2.01-2.13 ("Contested Elections"), §§ 3.01-3.10 ("Removal of Directors"), §§ 4.01-4.40 ("Operation of the
Board of Directors"), §§ 5.01-5.08 ("The Monitoring Model for Publicly Held Corporations") (1993) (with
supplements).
3.

See ARTHUR PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW ch. 5, "The Legal

Model and Corporate Governance" (1999).
4. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptionsin the Vertical Dimension of Global
CorporateGovernance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1134-45 (1999).
5. Curtis Milhaupt defines corporate governance as "[tihe structural environment for corporate decision
making." See Milhaupt, Institutional Change and M & A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002).
6. For a summary historical account, see Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and the New
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 605 (2001); Douglas Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility
Redux, 76 TUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
7. Thomas Friedman was the Chief Foreign Affairs correspondent of the New York Times and the
author of the popular and largely pro-globalization book entitled THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE
OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (1999).
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degradation of the environment, and the plantation production problem. Fourth, I
highlight, briefly, a few of the ongoing efforts of international organizations and
so-called "soft law" to solve some of the collective action problems which exist
among nation states as they attempt to prevent or forestall at least some of the
more obvious detrimental effects of large multinationals' presence on the globe.'
I. THE MYTH OF GLOBALIZATION

A.

Introduction

The creation of the large multinational corporate organization in ways that
will open up channels of communication and disperse the corporate nerve center
and other important functions about the earth, leading to truly global enterprise,
has been the exception and not the rule. The Daimler-Chrysler or Deutsche BankBankers Trust combinations, which many cite as evidence of the emergence of
truly multicultural, if not global, corporations, are not representative of what
empirical evidence demonstrates is occurring.
In an important new book, The Myth of the Global Corporation(The Myth), 9
the authors demonstrate that the globalization of large multinational corporations
is not taking place, or at least not occurring along the lines that some have predicted.
B.

"Beneficial" Globalization Versus "Detrimental" Globalization

Beneficial, healthy globalization would be characterized by technology
diffusion as well as other types of decentralization. Large multinational corporations
(MNCs) would be transferring research and development (R&D) efforts to
satellite operations in a meaningful way. Some of those receiving satellites would
be located in newly industrializing countries, and, perhaps, in less developed
countries as well. MNCs would be engaged in significant direct foreign
investment (DFI). By forming subsidiaries and joint ventures in countries around
the globe, MNCs would be making significant investments in plant and other
production facilities, in modernization efforts, and in human resources so as to be
able to decentralize the financial, marketing, and other "nerve center" aspects of
their businesses. Simultaneously, MNCs would be shaking free from their roots
and national origins, converging on a global model of governance and operation.

8. Professor Paul Stephan describes soft law as treaty provisions, trade agreements, corporate and HGO codes
of conduct, corporate vendor standards, codes of "best practices," and other outputs of the international and NGO
communities "that may provide a conceptual framework for [corporate] decisionmaking but [do] not seriously
constrain decisionmakers." Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INr'LL. & BUS. 681,707 (1997). One of the contentions of this article is that increasingly, in the
Twenty-First Century, soft law does inform and constrain corporate behavior.
9.

MYTH].

PAUL N. DOREMUS Er AL., THE MYTH OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION (1998) [hereinafter THE
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But "[t]he global corporation is mainly an American myth":' °
The ... idea[] that mobile corporations freed from political interference
are now somehow arbitraging diverse national structures and forcing an
involuntary process of convergence or an inevitable trend toward
openness... marks a road to discord. On the surface, there is indeed a
certain process of homogenization at work in a world where Americans
drive BMWs, Germans listen to Sony CD players, and Japanese eat
McDonald's hamburgers. But below the surface, where the roots of
leading MNCs remain lodged, our research indicates durable sources of
resistance to fundamental economic convergence."
Contrary to what global convergence advocates state, and "[h]owever lustily
they sing from the same hymnbook when they gather together in Davos or
Aspen, the leaders of the world's great business enterprises continue to differ in
their most fundamental strategic behavior and objectives."' 2
C. Lack of WidespreadDirect ForeignInvestment or Technology Diffusion
Worldwide DFI has expanded dramatically, from U.S.$500 billion in the
early 1980s to U.S.$2.0 trillion in the mid-1990s. 3 Yet, as the authors of The
Myth demonstrate, DFI remains concentrated in developed nations that are
members of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), or in a truncated version of that twenty-nine nation list. Japan still
closes its border to significant DFI. 14 E.U. domestic content requirements
discourage inward investment in the fifteen E.U. member countries, all of which
are OECD members. 5 The spreading of wealth and the globalization that high
absolute DFI numbers might portend is not occurring. When prosperous nonE.U. but OECD members such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States are excluded, it is clear that the lion's share of worldwide DFI is
going to a handful of nations that might be termed "developing," such as Chile,
Malaysia, Mexico, and Turkey.
Tracking the volume of international royalty and license fee transactions as
well as other statistics, the economist authors of The Myth ask "Is a global
technology base emerging?"' 6 They conclude that hard evidence suggests it is

10. Id. at 143.
I1. Id. at 146. In fact, the authors of THE MYTH surprised themselves: "Neither liberal nor radical
approaches to understanding multinational corporate behavior.., led us to expect the degree of continuing
diversity we found at the level of the firm." Id. at 141.
12. Id. at 144.
13. Id. at 74.
14. Id. at 77.
15. Id. at 78.
16. ld. at 84.
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not: "MNCs move R&D abroad far more slowly than production, sourcing,
marketing, and other business activities... MNCs conduct relatively little R&D
outside the home country." 7 Japanese foreign affiliates have particularly "low
R&D intensity."" Thus, "development of new technology remains centralized in
the home market operations of MNCs.' 9 The roots for future globalization or for
high quality globalization are not being put down.
D. The Resiliency of IncorporatingNation States' Cultures

Even in transnational mergers, which global convergence advocates feature
prominently in their writing, one culture (belief system) extinguishes the other,
rather than a convergence taking place. 0 National differences persist and "are
'hard wired' into corporate structures [that] embody distinctive and durable
ideologies or belief systems."'" Thus, an array of evidence documents striking
differences between the behavior of most continentally based firms and their
counterparts in Great Britain." Governance and financial structures "differ
markedly" among major nations.23 German firms differ markedly from firms in
Scandinavia, France or the Benelux countries.24 In fact, differences between
German and firms in other countries seem especially persistent.5

17. Id. at 85 (citation omitted); see also id. at 134 (recognizing that "MNCs still retain the bulk of their
innovative capabilities in their home markets, and technology that does flow overseas tends to stay within
multinational networks.
18. Id. at 93.
19. Id. at 109.
20. Id. at 15.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id. at 23.
24. See, e.g., id. at 13.
25. Based upon systematic evidence, the authors of THE MYTH see a picture of persistent difference and
resistance to change rooted in national origin. The German economy is characterized by codetermination of the
supervisory board of large firms, a large role played by universal banks which vote fifty percent or more of the
shares in all large German firms, and a pattern of cross share holdings. The result is an absence of hostile
takeovers, a comfortable safety net for managers in the event of serious managerial mistakes or unanticipated
market shocks because of the availability of backup resources from the banks, stable research and development
budgets and wider fluctuations in earnings than would be tolerated in other countries. See id. at 33-42.
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Japanese firms operate in foreign wholesale rather than retail markets, use
intrafirm investment to a great extent, and display "a comparatively low level of
integration in local markets." 6 In turn, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore
each reflect great and persistent differences from one another in governance, finance,
and other aspects of business."
The strongest determinant of these persistent differences is national origin.
These differences exhibit an obvious correlation with corporate nationality, not
with regional characteristics or industrial or financial maturity. These differences
"only one set
seem to be "systemic." Across firms, sectors, and in the aggregate,
28
of behavioral characteristic shines through-national ones.
Hence, a "chain" begins deep in the idiosyncratic national histories behind
durable domestic institutions and ideologies. That "chain" extends upward to
firm-level structures of internal governance and long-term financing. Those
structures, in turn, are then linked to continuing diversity in patterns of corporate
R&D operations. Distinctive national institutions and ideologies shape corporate
structure, and are vitally important policies in home markets. "The external
behavior of firms continues to be marked by their idiosyncratic foundations. 29
The Myth of the Global Corporation tells us, namely, that "national roots
remain a vital determinant" to many multinationals and that "corporate cores
remain national in a meaningful sense."'
II. A PRESSING PROBLEM OF THE NEW CENTURY: THE GROWTH AND
REGULATION OF LARGE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

A. Background
The inexorable growth of large multinationals has been one of the least
noticed phenomena of the 1990s and, in the new century, is only now receiving
the critical attention it deserves. The growth of large multinational and truly
international corporations poses a number of overlapping problems, such as the
irrelevancy-impotency of the nation state, the resulting field of play for economic
imperialism, and the resulting opportunities to engage in regulatory arbitrage, leading
to problems such as environmental degradation and "plantation production,"

26. Id. at 116.
27. Stewart R. Clegg & S. Gordon Redding, INTRODUCTION TO CAPITALISM INCONTRASTING CULTURES 14
(Stewart R. Clegg & Gordon Redding eds., 1990).
[I]t would be mistaken to regard these countries [Japan and the 'little dragons' of Hong Kong,
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore] as essentially similar in their patterns of economic
success. They have quite distinct foundations which are sufficiently different as to counter any
too easy reliance on a view of a single 'post-Confucian' way.
Id.
28. THE MYTH, supra note 9, at 139.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 145.
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especially in the new industrializing countries and developed countries of the world.
Traditional corporate governance theory, structure, and practices deal with solving
problems thought to be generated by the separation of ownership from control in
large publicly held corporations. They are simply irrelevant to the problems posed
by the growth of large, sprawling multinational entities.
B. The Accelerating Growth of Large Multinationals
The number and size of large MNCs have grown at geometric rather than
arithmetical rates as of late. MNCs are driven by a quest to achieve economies of
scale and to market products with the same ingredients, packaging, and logos to
all of the world's 6.2 billion inhabitants. Predictions are that by the year 2010 the
number of large multinationals will be several times the number that existed just
a few years ago."' Domestic and transnational merger activity is at an all time
high, particularly in commodities areas (oil, aluminum) but also in automobile
manufacture, telecommunications, and food. It appears that senior corporate
managers are engaged in a quest to be number one, two, or three in size on a
global, rather than merely a domestic or continental (E.U. or NAFTA) scale.
The quest to be in a handful of the largest corporations in a given field, and
on a global scale, is driving a headlong pursuit of size, manifesting itself in a
worldwide merger movement. The acquisition by Alcoa Aluminum of Reynolds
Metals Co. illustrates this trend3 2 Alcoa faced a situation in which three smaller
foreign rivals combined to form an aluminum multinational with $21 billion in
worldwide sales."3 Alcoa's CEO felt that Alcoa had no choice but to make a 'bear
hug' offer for the world's third largest producer of aluminum products, Reynolds
Metals. After the acquisition, Alcoa will rival the world's largest producer, with
slightly less than $21 billion in annual sales. 34

31. See Eric W. Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1962 (1998)
(highlighting that "[i]n the late twentieth century, the exponential growth of multinational or transnational
corporate enterprise qualifies as one of the most important historical developments."). Looking to the past,
multinationals accounted for 18% of the world's manufacturing output and 7.5% of total global output in 1992.
Martin Wolf, The Heart of the New World Economy, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 1, 1997, at 16.
32. See Robert Guy Matthews et al., Fitness Test: Alcoa-Reynolds Union Bears Stamps of Deal Rocking
Commodities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1999, at Al (noting "the latest in a string of recent deals that have seen one
commodity giant gobble up another... [and]... mergers reflect the confluence of three important trends: industry
consolidation, convergence of once-distinct lines of products or services, and globalization"); Matthews et al.,
Commodity Crunch: Alcoa-Reynolds Deal Shows the Logic of Merger Dynamics from Aluminum to Oil,
Survival of the Fittest Is Now the Orderof the Day, WALL ST. J. (Eur.), Aug. 20, 1999, at 1.
33. See Nikhil Deogun & Robert Guy Matthews, Reynolds Metals Yields to Alcoa's Bid, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 20, 1999, at A3 (describing Alcoa's reaction to the three way merger of Canada's Alcan Aluminum, Ltd.,
France's Pechiney, SA, and Switzerland's Alusuisse Lonza Group). But see Anita Raghavan & Nikhil Deogun,
Alcan's Merger Plan May be in Jeopardy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2000, at A3 (noting antitrust opposition by
Commission of the European Union).
34. Deogun & Matthews, supra note 33, at A3.

2002 / The Social Responsibility of Large MultinationalCorporations

In another commodities field, oil, Exxon acquired Mobil Oil in a $81.2
billion combination.35 The British Petroleum-Amoco merger represented a $48
billion transaction, which was followed by a proposed BP Amoco PLC buyout of
Atlantic Richfield Co. for $30 billion more.36 In the summer of 1999, France's

Fina Petroleum made an offer for Elf
international oil company. Reminiscent of
Man" affair of the 1980s, Elf countered with
the two corporations agreed on a friendly

Acquitaine, France's other large
the Bendix Martin Marietta "Pac
a bid for Fina. Later in the summer,
amalgamation that resulted in the

world's fourth largest oil company.37 Later, in October 2000, the Chevron
acquisition of Texaco for $38 billion relegated the combined French entity to
fifth place worldwide.38 The merger wave continued with Phillips Petroleum's
November 2001 announcement that it was to acquire Conoco.39
Global oligopoly seems a near certain prospect for the world's automobile
manufacturing industry. Chrysler and Daimler-Benz have combined 40 as have
Ford and Volvo. 4' In March 1999, Renault S.A. of France took effective control
of Nissan Motor Co. 42 In 2000, General Motors Corporation held talks with Fiat
SPA. 43 These latter business combinations involve not only sheer size,4 but also
portend an age of increasing transnational takeover and merger activity.
Carlo De Benedetti's 1988 attempt to take over Societe Generale de Belgique was
45

characterized as the first major transnational takeover, hostile or friendly, in the E.U.

35. Steve Liesman & Alexei Barrionuevo, Exxon and Mobil Shareholders Approve the $81.2 Billion
Merger, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1999, at A4.
36. John R. Wilke& Steve Liesman, BPAmoco's Arco Buyout FacesHurdles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2,1999, at A2.
37. Thomas Kamm & Bhushan Bahree, French Oil Giants Agree to $48.7 Billion Merger: Elf Total
Fina End Battle with Deal that Creates World's No. 4 Player,WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1999, at A15.
38. See, e.g., Neela Banerjee & Mary Williams Walsh, Texaco Hopes Chevron Can Polish Fading Star,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 2000, at 15.
39. See Robert Frank & Alexei Barrionuevo, Phillips Petroleum, Conoco Agree to Merge, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 19, 2001, at A3; see also Conoco & Phillips Petroleum, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B7 (reporting a
merger approved by a 97% vote of Phillips' shareholders).
40. Keith Bradsher, Effective Today, ChryslerandDaimler.Benz Are One, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at C4.
41. Edmund L. Andrews, "Ford-Volvo": A Dealfor All Sweden, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at C 1.
42. Peter Landers, How Cable & Wireless Pulled Off an Upset in Japanese Takeover, WALL ST. J., Nov.
10, 1999, at Al.
43. Deborah Ball, Fiatand GM Are Holding Talks About Alliance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2000, at A3;
Keith Bradsher, New Terrain Drives GlobalAuto Industry to Merge, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 24, 2000, at 1.
44. The drug industry is another example of a sector headed toward oligopoly. See, e.g., Stephen D.
Moore et al., SmithKline and Glaxo Agree to Merger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at A3 (noting that the $75.7
billion English-Swiss corporate combination will create the world's largest drug company); Robert Langreth,
Pfizer, Warner Lambert Agree on Terms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A3 (reporting that the $84 billion
transaction will create the world's second largest drug company).
45. See William C. Symonds et al., De Benedetti's Grab for a Big Piece of Belgium, BUS. WK., Feb. 1,
1988, at 42. The De Benedetti bid may have helped hurry along the E.U.'s efforts on the transnational merger
front. See generally Nathalie Basaldua, Towards the Harmonization of EC Member States' Regulations on
Takeover Bids: The Proposalfor a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
487, 491 (1989) (highlighting "[c]ertainly the best known example [of a takeover bid] in Europe [to be] the
hostile bid in January 1988 for Societe Generale de Belgique ... by the Italian entrepreneur, Carlo de
Benedetti").
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By that time, of course, the United States had witnessed a crazy decade of merger
activity, hostile takeovers, insider trading scandals and financial excesses.
Europe and the E.U. member states are awakening, if not catching up to the
United States. In summer 1999, Bank Nationale of France made two simultaneous
$38 billion hostile offers, for Paribus and for Belgium's Societe Generale. 46 Deutsche
Bank in Germany and Bankers Trust in the United States have combined.47
Recently, in telecommunications, Mannesmann A.G., the largest German
wireless company, has acquired Orange
S48 PLC, Britain's third largest wireless
corporation, in a $33 billion transaction. Vodafone Airtouch, PLC then made a
offer for Mannesmann, one of the first takeover bids for a large German firm.49
The size of the acquisitions has become truly staggering. In the 1980s the
RJR Nabisco transaction featured in Barbariansat the Gate was thought to have
set a record for the size of the deal, a record that would endure, at $24 billion. 0
The MCI World Wide Communications proposed acquisition of Sprint was a
$115 billion transaction. 5' The America Online/Time Warner combination was a
$165 billion transaction. 2 The Vodafone offer for Mannesmann, A.G. was valued
at $180 billion.53
C. An Illustrative New Multinational
A recent business combination of two multinationals frames the issues
nicely. Unilever, a Netherlands based food and consumer products company, is a
mid-size multinational which has one hundred and thirty eight subsidiaries in
seventy-one countries worldwide: eleven in North America, fifteen in the Latin
America, twenty-three in Africa and the Middle East, twenty-three on the Pacific
Rim,
f'in
and
offErp
Europe. Its
Rififty-five
i the
h E.U.,
..
n eleven
lvni in the
h remainder
eane
t

46. See Advertisement, Bank National Popular (BNP), INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), July 26, 1999, at 7
(emphasizing that "[s]hareholders of Societe Generale and Paribus-Only 5 Days Left to Maximize Your
Investment-Tender Your Shares to BNP"); Editorial, Let the Market Decide, WALL ST. J. (Eur.), July 1, 1999,
at 8.
47. Christopher Rhoads, Deutshe Bank's Bet Looks to be Paying Off. In Buying Bankers Trust, German
Lender Boosts Investment Bank Profit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1999, at A16.
48. William Boston & Anita Raghavan, Mannesmann Agrees to Buy U.K.'s Orange for Cash, Stock,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at A15.
49. Gautam Naik & Anita Raghavan, Vodafone to Sweeten Mannesmann Offer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17,
1999, at A3.
50. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO 480
(1990).
51. Rebecca Blumenstein, MCI Says Sprint Unit's Losses May Weigh on Firm, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9,
1999, at B9.
52. See Saul Hansell, America Online Agrees to Buy Time Warner for $165 Billion-Media Deal is
Richest Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,2000, at Al.
53. Philip Shishkin & William Boston, Vodafone Wins E.U. Clearance to Acquire Mannesmann in Record $180
Billion Deal, WAIL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2000, at A 14.
54. UNILEVER ANNUAL ACCOUNTS 1999 41-43 (2000) (noting Principal Group Companies and Fixed
Investments as of December 31, 1999).
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worldwide sales are approximately $44 billion." It employs 2.55 million people
56
of whom 550,000 million work on corporate owned plantations.
In May 2000, Unilever made overtures to a smaller U.S. based food multinational,
Best Foods Co. With $10 billion or so in worldwide sales, Best has sixty-two
subsidiaries operating in one hundred and ten different countries, many on the Pacific
Rim.57 Combined, after the $20.3 billion acquisition, with elimination of some overlap,
the two multinationals will have over two hundred subsidiaries in over one hundred
and thirty countries, with Best Foods' strong presence in Asia complementing nicely
Unilever's presence in the Americas and the E.U. The combined entity is now the
world's second largest food company, after Nestle of Switzerland, with Kraft Foods of
the United States ranking third.5
A corporate organization such as the combined Unilever-Best organization
illustrates nicely four interrelated regulatory problems: (1) power, size, and the
resulting irrelevancy-impotency of the nation state; (2) increased economic
imperialism; (3) regulatory arbitrage; and (4) the related "plantation production"
problem.

III. PERCEIVED PROBLEMS POSED BY THE GROWTH IN SIZE AND NUMBER OF
LARGE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
A. The Power and Size of Multinationalsand the Irrelevancy of the Nation
State
In the 1990s, the case for regulation clearly departs from the fifty plus year
search by law professors and reformers to fill the vacuum created by the
separation of ownership from control Berle and Means hypothesized in 1932.' 9
Berle and Means's analysis implicitly assumes a large but not all powerful
corporation operating, by and large, subject to the dictates of a single nation state
which, in theory, possesses sufficient power to regulate should it desire to do so.
Later reforms of the corporate social responsibility movement, such as federal
chartering of corporations 6° or federal minimum standards, 6' hypothesized a lack

55. UNILEVER CHARTS 1989-98 2 (2000).
56. Id. at 10.
57. Joyce Gannon, Besrfoods: A Big Company You Never Heard Of, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept.
16, 1999, at A11.
58. Shelly Branch, Mammoth Deals Are Expected to Spur More Consolidation in the Food Industry,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2000, at A3.
59. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1991); ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, supra note 3, at 83, 90.
60. See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION: THE CASE FOR
FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (Corporate Accountability Research Group, 1976); RALPH
NADER, Er AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); Donald Schwartz, Federal Chartering of
Corporations:An Introduction,61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972).
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of a will to regulate, brought on by charter mongering and the "race to the
bottom" engaged in by the states.6' Those proposals still assumed, however, the
power of the nation state, in the form of the federal government, to bend
corporations to its will if it wished to do so.
Today, however, large corporate empires sprawl across the globe. The power
of the corporation may not only exceed that of any host state, but also that of the
incorporating state. With a combined $54 billion in sales, the Unilever-Best
entity has an annual turnover that exceeds the gross domestic product (GDP) of
all but about fifty nations, including Ecuador, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
and Kenya, ranking just behind the Republic of Ireland whose GDP is $59.9
billion. 61 Often the nation states in which subsidiaries operate and in which
externalities are most felt do not have the power (or the will) to regulate. 6 This
scenario brings renewed call for the domiciliary state of the parent corporation to
assert itself.65
In turn, incorporating host nation states may refuse to take adequate action
because of the fear that large multinationals may reincorporate elsewhere.
Indeed, a multinational could move to an offshore incorporating jurisdiction like
the Netherlands Antilles, the Cook Islands, Grand Cayman, in which secrecy
prevails and the threat of meaningful regulation is nil. 66 Indeed, an American

61. The leading piece was by the late Professor William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (positing a "race to the bottom" in states' competition for
incorporations).
62. The opposing view was that competition for charters produced an efficient mix of legal rules,
resulting in a "race to the top" rather than "a race to the bottom." Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race
for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALl Project and Uniformity in CorporateLaw, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 433
(1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware's CorporationLaw, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913,920-22 (1982).
63. See, e.g., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1999, at http://www.odci.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/(last visited Oct. 17, 2002) (copy on file with The TransnationalLawyer).
64. Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations,in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
258-60 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (noting that "multinational corporations often seem like ghosts
escaping the various national and international laws that reach out impotently to claim them" and "[sipread out
among various countries, the operations of multinational corporations are often above the law of any particular
country."); see also KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 39
(1995).
65. In response to which are heard replies that even domiciliary states lack the power or the will to
regulate. ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 2 1ST CENTURY CAPITALISM
136-53 (1991) (positing "[t]he coming irrelevancy of corporate nationality"); Orts, supra note 64, at 253
(citation omitted).
Even when the international context is explicitly considered [by American legal academics in
their writings] ... discussion often degenerates into a neomercantilist debate over comparative
models of corporate law. This debate is neomercantilist because it advances the assumption
that multinational corporations will necessarily act as faithful instruments of the nation-states
in which their parents are incorporated, rather than recognizing the more complex reality that
multinationals are in fact becoming more and more "stateless."
Id.
66. A vexing conundrum has been precisely why so few, if any, multinationals have moved to an
offshore incorporating state. Scholars have raised the possibility of a "bandit" multinational moving off shore
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icon, Stanley Works, makers of hand tools and other products known to every
do-it-yourself homeowner, recently attempted to leave its Connecticut domicile
to incorporate in Bermuda, largely for tax reasons, but was driven back on shore
by a protracted outcry, which included litigation against Stanley by the Connecticut

Attorney General. 67
Observations as to sheer power and size have led many scholars to predict or
proclaim the irrelevancy of corporate law and of the identity of the incorporating
state.6 s
B. Economic Imperialism

On quaint Fort Street, in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, a U.S. Banana
Republic store and a Burger King have displaced a Scots Tartan store and a
teashop that had been on Fort Street for decades. The main street of a middle size
town in Malaysia will be lined with U.S. franchised fast food outlets: a Kentucky
Fried Chicken, an A&W Root Beer, and a Burger King. Can a GAP store be far
behind? The U.S.-based McDonalds is everywhere, its stores and its billboards
despoiling the urban and the rural landscapes of countries around the globe.
In their attempts to homogenize the world, U.S. multinationals often attempt
to march in under the banner of free trade. Monsanto has attempted to shoehorn

its genetically engineered seed products into the E.U. over the objections of
French farmers. 69 Prodded by U.S.-based multinational producers, the U.S. Trade

Representative argues for the introduction into European markets of beef fattened
using human growth hormones. 70
This is the new economic imperialism. That imperialism views the eradication
of all barriers as tantamount to globalization. That imperialism wants a world

without borders so that the same products and services dominate market after

but it seems not to have occurred. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD 19141991 278 (1996) (describing "[a] suitably complex and ingenious combination of the legal loopholes in the
corporate and labour laws of kindly mini-territories-for instance, Curacao, the Virgin Islands and
Liechtenstein--could do wonders for a firm's balance-sheet").
67. See generally Phyllis Plitch & Glenn R. Simpson, Bowing to Pressure, Stanley Works Drops Plan
for Bermuda Tax Move, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at A1.
68. See supra note 65 and related discussion; see also Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A
Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 925 (1996).
69. Sam Lowenberg, For American Businesses Lobbying the European Union Has Become a Priority,
AM. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 1 (noting that Monsanto hired a former U.S. trade representative to lobby
the E.U. and to overcome French opposition to genetically engineered seed products); Bill Lambrecht, World
Recoils at Monsanto's Brave New Crops, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al; Sam Loewenberg,
Cultivating Allies in Genetic Food Fight, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 14.
70. In retaliation, the United States put punitive tariffs on Roquefort cheese, French mustard, and other
luxury foods, sparking destruction of a McDonald's in France and elevation of the French farmer who led the
raid to the status of anti-globalization folk hero. Suzanne Daley, French Turn Vandal into Hero Against U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at Al; Suzanne Daley, French See a Hero in War on 'McDomination,' N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1999, at Al.
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market. That imperialism uses globalization as a bulldozer to crush resistance for
the achievement of those goals by the multinational corporations, which are the
progenitors of economic imperialism.
C. Regulatory Arbitrage by Multinationals
The need to regulate, based upon the global scenario, is buttressed by a
refinement, the notion of regulatory arbitrage, "defined as "[m]ultinational
flexibility [which] allows firm ...

to shift operations among countries to take

advantage of differing legal requirements, for example, lower labor costs due to
absence of minimum wage laws or unions, more flexible antitrust or tax law, or
weaker environmental law." 7' A multinational may locate activities in nation
states in which the regulation poses the least, or no, obstacle to the activity in
which the multinational wishes to engage. For example, the multinational may
locate a polluting facility in a former Soviet Republic in which environmental
law or enforcement is not only lax, but non-existent. The same multinational
might locate a "knockoff' manufacturing facility in a nation with a large market
for the product and little or no protection for intellectual property, such as in the
People's Republic of China. With labor-intensive manufacturing, the multinational
may seek out a developing nation eager for employment at any cost and locate a
facility there. Through time, the multinational may shift activities from country
to country, depending upon the regulatory obstacles that spring up in the
multinational's path, usually as the standard of living and expectations rise. 72
A combined Unilever-Best, with two hundred separate operations already
existent in one hundred and thirty countries around the globe, and on every
continent save Antarctica, illustrates the potential for regulatory arbitrage open to
managers of a far flung multinational.
D. The PlantationProductionProblem
Multinationals may move activities to host nations in which working
conditions are substandard to atrocious and in which wages paid do not rise even
to the level of a living wage. Over decades, a manufacturer might move a facility
from Korea to Malaysia to Indonesia to Vietnam. Newly industrializing countries of
Africa could be next in the parade of host states. In other instances, a
manufacturer may move manufacture or assembly activities from facility to

71. See Orts, supra note 64, at 250 (citing Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition,
Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993)).
72. Nike is an example of a multinational that has engaged in regulatory arbitrage over time. As wages
and expectations rise and requirements for better working conditions are adopted by host nations, Nike has
moved its athletic shoe manufacturing facilities from Korea to Thailand, then to Indonesia, and currently, to
Vietnam.
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facility in the same country, as in the "maquiladora" phenomenon that occurred
in Mexico and has accelerated under NAFTA.73
Host states often welcome roving multinationals, despite the exploitation of
their citizens involved. In competition for economic growth, other states that may
be prone to regulate at least more extreme forms of worker exploitation do not do
so, fearing a competitive disadvantage. Among nation states, a collective action
problem exists that may be solved by international organizations, such as the
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) or the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Within the WTO, however, the newly industrialized
countries and the lesser developed countries resist, perceiving WTO efforts to
regulate plantation production as a ploy by wealthier states to keep these
countries in 'their place.' 74 Given the economic disparities among nations around
the globe, the plantation production problem seems an intractable one,75 certainly
not susceptible to traditional corporate governance analysis.
IV. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SOFT LAW

Again, traditional corporate governance deals with what fills the void created
by the separation of ownership from control (the role independent directors,
federal chartering, social accounting and conflict of interest disclosure). The
modern Berle and Means corporation represents a new form of property in that
those who own the property, the dispersed shareholders, no longer control it.
If the shareholders think that the corporation is headed in the wrong direction
or its assets being mismanaged by those in control, collective action problems
would hinder shareholders from coming together again to assert, or to re-assert,
themselves. Collective action problems include the simple difficulty of
shareholders knowing who else owns shares in a particular corporation; the costs
of communicating with them either by mail or telephone; and today's costs posed
by regulatory compliance, such as the proactive shareholder's compliance with

73. Maquiladoras assemble motor vehicle parts, electric capacitors, stuffed animal toys, apparel,
televisions sets, electric motors, and a host of other products often for multinationals, using low cost labor in tilt
up construction facilities that may change products on a sixty or ninety-day basis. See generally KHOSROW
FATEMI, THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC SOLUTION OR PROBLEM? (1990); KATHRYN KOPINAK,
DESERT CAPITALISM: MAQUILADORAS IN NORTH AMERICA'S WESTERN INDUSTRIAL CORRIDOR (1996); LESLIE
SKLAIR, ASSEMBLING FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE MAQUILA INDUSTRY IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES

(1989).
74. Compare Jonathan Peterson, Leadership Struggle Reflects Growing Schism in WTO Trade, L.A. TIMES, July
21, 1999, at Cl, with Tyrone Beason, WTO in Seattle: Herman Bids to Put Labor on Agenda Clinton Administration
Official Promotes Worker Rights, SEATMETIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at El.
75. In addition to the potential for oppression of less developed countries, law making in the
international context brings another set of problems. The bureaucrats, trade representatives, and others who
make law in the international sphere lack accountability to any electorate. See generally Stephan, supra note 8,
at 681. Critics "assert that the establishment of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO) will mean
that state and federal legislatures no longer may decide what kind of environmental safeguards or standards of
consumer and worker protection we will have." Id.
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the SEC's rules prohibiting solicitation of any form of consent, such as a proxy
for voting shares, unless the person communicating with other shareholders
complies with the SEC's proxy solicitation rules. Compliance with those rules
may impose large direct costs (hiring a fancy, or at least sophisticated, lawyer,
paper and printing, and mailing and postage), as well as indirect ones (formal
filings give the corporation's attorneys a stationary target, and they can, and will,
sue an activist shareholder for a mere slip of the pen because the SEC's rules
permit suit for omissions or misleading statements that are the product merely of
a lack of reasonable care).76 In 1992, the SEC attempted to, and did, liberalize its
rules so as to permit shareholders to communicate to one another how they
intended to vote on a matter, but a coordinated campaign by U.S. corporate
interests caused the SEC to pull its punch on more ambitious reforms.77
A collective action problem susceptible of no ready solution is the "free
rider" problem. Often many fellow shareholders will share the view that the
corporation's managers are not managing the corporation's assets or affairs
properly. But rather than joining the shareholder activist who wishes to do
something about mismanagement, the other shareholders, even the sympathetic
ones, may lie back in wait, not expending their own time or other resources in the
activist effort. In other words, the other shareholders are willing to "free ride" on
the efforts of their pro-active brethren. Too many "free riders" will doom any
collective effort, whether it be in a homeowners' association, a parent teacher
group, or a publicly held corporation.
Of course, the SEC does not regulate collective action by nation states or
solicitation of "proxies" or other forms of consent from them. Some nation states,

76. Under SEC Rule 14a-9, which contains a blanket prohibition on misleading statements by the
shareholder or proxy contestant who misstates the facts or omits material facts may be found to have violated
the rule if she failed merely to exercise reasonable care. See, e.g., Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 79
(3d Cir. 1988); Wilson v. Great Am. Ind., Inc., 855 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1988). See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN,
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 449, 590-92 (4th ed. 2002). That low standard gives corporations a
broad potential opening to shut down, via court proceedings and injunctions, any activist shareholder for "a slip
of the pen." Before the fact, the rule and its interpretation discourages free and open communications among
shareholders. Anomalously, in every other area of securities law, in order to obtain judicial relief, the SEC or a
private plaintiff must prove "scienter," that is, intentionally misleading conduct or gross negligence of a severe
sort. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1981).
77. In the early 1990s, the SEC undertook an initiative to lessen burdens posed by its regulation of proxy
solicitation. The most significant reform, while not earth shaking, was significant. It permitted shareholders to
communicate with one another if they stated only how they intended to vote on a measure and why. Such
limited communication would not be a solicitation which would trigger SEC filing requirements and the
associated compliance costs. The reform opened the way for large institutional investors especially to signal to
one another their reactions to various corporate and shareholder proxy proposals. See, e.g., Robert S.
Frenchman, The Recent Revisions to the Federal Proxy Regulations: Lifting the Ban on Shareholder
Communications, 68 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1993); Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing
ShareholderParticipationin Corporate Governance: Too Little, Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 379 (1994); Jill
Hornstein, Proxy Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate
Governance, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (1993); Norma M. Sharara & Anne Hoke-Witherspoon, The Evolution of
the 1992 Shareholder Communication Rules and Their Impact on Corporate Governance, 49 BUS. LAW. 327
(1993).
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however, do experience some of the same collective action problems that dispersed
shareholders experience. Rogue states lack the will, or more charitably perhaps,
the resources, to regulate large multinationals operating within their borders.
Other states deplore the situation, but persist in "free riding" on the efforts of the
states that do exhibit a will to attempt regulation.
The best hope for solving these collective action problems are international
organizations. The current players are the United Nations (UN), the OECD, the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the WTO.
The UN began as a contender, with its proposed "UN Convention on
Transnational Corporations."" This document has become a dead letter. The UN
ceased its efforts.7 9 The UN convention is not readily available in most libraries
and has become exceedingly difficult to obtain.
The OECD has evolved a Code of Best Practices for multinational
corporations. 8° It is a purely voluntary code. There are no teeth to it. Viewed as it
is, as an elitist Paris based organization of twenty-nine nation states, the OECD
has limited influence with many nations and governments. 8' OECD products,
such as its code, produce a backlash in many transition economies and newly
industrializing nation states, although the OECD anti-corruption convention has
been a great success.8 ' But with the Guidelines for Multinational Corporations,
the less developed countries and the newly industrialized countries are unlikely
to hold up the OECD code, waving it in the figurative face of a large
multinational corporation.
The World Bank and the IMF have been active in many of the less developed
countries and newly industrializing countries. The World Bank and the IMF do
have a "hammer" over nation states in that states that do not commit to the IMF
and World Bank program will not receive urgently needed loan disbursements
from those organizations. The World Bank/IMF program is to impose upon lower

78. UN Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (1990), reprinted in 20 UNITED NATIONS
LIBRARY ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
app. 2 (1994).
79. Prospects for the UN code are discussed in Seymour J. Rubin, Transnational Corporations and
International Codes of Conduct: A Study of the Relationship Between International Cooperation and Economic
Development, 10 AM. U. J. INT'LL & POL'Y 1275, 1285-86 (1995).
80. OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/
cime/mneguide.htm (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
81. In addition to the 15 member states of the European Union, the OECD has as members the following
nation states: Australia, Canada, Finland, Korea, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, New Zealand, United
States, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, and Turkey. See http://oecd.org/EN/countrylist (last visited Apr. 16,
2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
82. See, e.g., Jong Bum Kin, Korean Implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention: Implications for
Global Efforts to Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 245 (2002); see also Ms. Cynthia Wallace,
Videotape: A Symposium on the Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law in the Twenty-First Century
(Feb. 23, 2002) (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
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developed countries and newly industrialized countries what Thomas Friedman
refers to as the "Golden Straitjacket."83
The Golden Straightjacket has many elements, several of which are: fiscal
austerity by government; privatization of state owned enterprise; limitation of
government to provision of core types of public goods; modernization of economic
laws so as to make both the lesser developed countries and the newly industrialized
countries receptive to DFI; and elimination of corruption. Lately, the World Bank has
pledged to turn more of its attention toward the alleviation of chronic poverty, defined
as per capita income of less than one U.S. dollar per day. 4
Absent from the agenda of the World Bank and the IMF IS significant
proposals designed to deal with the problems posed by the growth in number and
size of large multinational corporations. Indeed, many view the World Bank/IMF
agenda as user friendly to multinationals, that is, promoting globalization as a
bulldozer. The Golden Straightjacket homogenizes nation states. One possible
motivation for doing so is to ease the burdens on multinationals as they roam
about the earth.
The brighter spots, and better hope for the future, lie in the WTO, the Kyoto
Accords in the environmental area, and nongovernmental organizations that are
international in scope such as the Workers' Rights Consortium, the Fair Labor
Association, and the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). The latter organization has
a worldwide program for monitoring harvesting practices of the forest products
industry. In the U.S. alone, the FSC has obtained the support of Home Depot,
Wickes, Lowes, and Anderson Windows, among others. Those corporations have
agreed to sell only products bearing the FSC symbol and seal of approval. The
FSC mark of approval has become influential in the investment community as
well.85
Many multinationals have adopted vendor standards of conduct, which insure
that multinationals and their subcontractors provide adequate worker health and
safety protections, prohibit child labor, and pay a living wage (by host country
standards). Levis Strauss, the denim garment manufacturer, was among the first
to adopt such a code but GAP and Nike have followed. The Walt Disney
Company, which manufactures stuffed toy animals and other products in Mexico
and elsewhere, has a code that is regarded by many as the paradigm."

83. For a discussion on World Bank and IMF policies, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 7.
84. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Turning Point Seen in War on Poverty, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002 (noting
comments of World Bank President James Wolfensohn); Blustein, O'Neill Targets World Bank's PovertyFighting Strategy, WASH. POST, May 16, 2001; Robert Samuelson, Persistent Poverty, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
2000 (noting that the desperately poor as defined by World Bank are those living on less than one U.S. dollar
per day). In 2000, the World Bank published a 335 page report, GLOBAL POVERTY.
85. See generally Jim Carlton, How Home Depot and Activists Joined to Cut Logging Abuse, WALL ST.
J.,
Sept. 26, 2000, at I.
86. See generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Transnational Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue:
Leveling the Playing Field for Developing Country Workers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 611, 650-53 (2001).
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Paradigm code or not, the key is in the monitoring of compliance by vendors
and in the enforcement. At least two nongovernmental organizations, the
Workers' Rights Consortium (WRC) and the Fair Labor Association, attempt to
monitor compliance and report violations of vendor-worker codes. The WRC
includes in its membership forty-six household name universities, which field
teams in high profile intercollegiate sports and on whose behalf sportswear with
university logos is manufactured in Nicaragua, Indonesia, and elsewhere. 87 Many
multinationals, such as Reebok and Gap, favor the Fair Labor Association and
88
even had a hand in founding the organization.
The WTO has a powerful enforcement tool. By withholding most favored nation
status or participation in multinational trade agreements, the WTO may be able to
force even rogue states to comply with minimal environmental protection standards
and core worker health and safety standards. The lesser developed countries and new
industrialized countries see the WTO insertion of "green" and other social
responsibility provisions in trade agreements and treaties not as an effort to curb the
power of large multinational corporations. Rather, they see such provisions as
Trojan horses, hiding within it an agenda to make the wealthier nation states
wealthier yet or at least an agenda to preserve their hegemony. The lesser developed
countries and new industrialized countries and their citizens will thus not receive
their due in trade negotiations with the WTO ferments. How that struggle among
rich, poor, and not so rich nation states will play out will make for interesting
watching in the next ten years or so.
V. CONCLUSION

Globalization in the Twenty-First Century brings with it a whole host of
problems that corporate law has not faced previously. In fact, perhaps corporate
law is not up to the task and will never face the problems posed by the size and
geographical reach of large multinationals. Corporate law, as we know it, deals
with problems of "vertical governance." The new problems are problems of
"horizontal" governance.
Rather than the organic corporate law of nation states, under which
corporations are formed and regulated, and the power allocated among the
various governance organs of the corporation, our attention will be shifted away
from what we have heretofore dealt with as "corporate law." Instead, in the large
multinational corporate sphere, we will focus much more upon soft law, that is,
87. See Weekend Journal, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2000, at W17 (reporting that Nike and its founder
withdrew support from the University of Oregon because Nike joined the WRC); Nike, Inc: Second University
to Lose License, Funding Contract, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2000, at B6 (noting that Nike withdrew funding for
University of Michigan athletics because Michigan joined WRC).
88. See Mattel Creates System to Monitor Conditions in Overseas Factories, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
1997, at B9 (reporting that Mattel joins with Nike, Levi Strauss, Reebok, Walt Disney, and GAP to enact "a
code of conduct for its overseas factories and an independent audit and monitoring system to ensure
compliance").
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aspirational codes of best practices such as the Cadbury Code or the ALI
Corporate Governance Project; voluntary codes of conduct and vendor standards;
non-governmental organizations, their standards, and their monitoring activities;
trade agreements and treaties that also attempt to influence internal corporate
affairs; international organizations such as the OECD that undertake similar
efforts but not through trade law; and stock exchanges that will compete amongst
each other in devising optimal governance standards.
In the Twenty-First Century, and within the multinational area, we shall see
an entirely new panoply of norms and organizations that will attempt to influence
corporate behavior.89 It is to that hinterland beyond traditional studies of
corporate law to which corporate lawyers and legal scholars should shift much of
their attention.

89. See generally Symposium, Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607-2191 (2001).
Speakers and authors in the symposium talked and wrote about everything but law, including "shaming," game
theory, voluntary disclosure, and "norms," skipping entirely over the area loosely labeled "soft law" in favor of
the nebulous, the ridiculous, and the bizarre. But see Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms in
Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869 (2001).

